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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 July 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Spaak's 8 July Conversation with
Khrushchev

1. In briefing the NATO Council last Friday on his 8 July talk with Khrushchev, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak emphasized at the outset that there were many ambiguities in the Soviet Premier's remarks. Spaak stressed that there was a "marked difference" between the 8 July talk and their previous talk in September 1961.

2. Spaak pointed out that in 1961 Khrushchev had clear ideas on the then existing situation and had suggested "some possibilities for settlement of the Berlin and German problems" with the hope that these would be restated to NATO. Accordingly, Khrushchev had then put forward clear and categorical ideas, since he wanted to make practical and precise suggestions to the West. This was not the case during the 8 July talk. Spaak said Khrushchev's opinions, as set forth in their recent Kiev conversation, were "more confused, more vague, more fluctuating and often contradictory." Spaak's report, therefore, contains a great deal of personal interpretation and, in his own words, "a greater chance of error."

3. According to Spaak, the subject of disarmament was the "most positive part" of the 8 July talk. Spaak said Khrushchev "appeared to think" it would be possible to conclude a partial test-ban agreement which excluded underground testing. The former NATO Secretary General "had the impression" that Khrushchev

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might be willing to set up more than three "black boxes" to control a ban on underground testing. The Soviet Premier, however, indicated no change from his well-known position that there is no distinction between international control--i.e., on-site inspections with roving international personnel--and espionage.

4. Spaak said that while the Soviet leader mentioned a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, "it did not seem to be a particular importance" to Khrushchev. Spaak stated that although Khrushchev expressed agreement with the "idea" of a nonaggression accord, he was "not as enthusiastic" as Spaak had expected he would be.

5. Spaak was "surprised and disturbed" by Khrushchev's raising of the subject of Germany and Berlin. According to Spaak, Khrushchev put forward his ideas on these matters "in an extremely vigorous manner." (Khrushchev had also conducted himself in this way during his early June talk with Laborite leader Harold Wilson. He was very mild on Berlin and Germany, however, in his public statements during his recent visit to East Germany.) There is no indication in Spaak's report that Khrushchev set any deadlines for a settlement of the German question. Spaak himself noted that Khrushchev "reduced somewhat" his aggressiveness on the German and Berlin questions during the course of their conversation.

6. The Belgian Foreign Minister also noted that Khrushchev stressed "peaceful coexistence," and a stand against war. At one point Khrushchev said that "even incidents" in Berlin and Germany "could not lead" to a nuclear war and "only a fool" would start such a war.

7. Khrushchev did not, apparently, discuss Cuba or Castro. Nor did he discuss his differences with the Chinese Communists. Spaak believes that the Sino-Soviet negotiations are the "missing link" in Western efforts to understand what Soviet policies will be "tomorrow."

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8. In contradistinction to 1961, Khrushchev talked a great deal about the Soviet Union and its "great industrial power." According to Spaak, he "seemed primarily preoccupied" with domestic problems and gave a long dissertation particularly on Soviet agricultural difficulties.

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